海外之声 | 史蒂夫汉克：着眼广义货币才是关键（中英双语）
观点速递
本文作者是IMI国际顾问、约翰霍普金斯大学教授史蒂夫· 汉克。本文原文发表于2018年3月30日福布斯网站（Forbes.com），《福布斯杂志》是一个可靠的商业新闻和金融信息的主要来源。
自从美联储开始提高联邦基金利率，市场便开始猜测美联储会于何时提高这一利率，提高的幅度有多大？每当针对这一问题的回答凝聚成共识，各国市场都将面临骤升或暴跌。最大的风险在于，美联储这一脚急刹车可能会用力过猛，导致广义货币增长减速。这将造成总需求增长减速，原本较为平衡的局面也会受到影响。如果各位想继续关注这一方面，就不要沉迷于美联储基金率变化，而是着眼于广义货币——迪维希亚货币的最佳衡量指标。
中文译文如下：
着眼广义货币才是关键
史蒂夫·H·汉克
翻译：谭笑
审校：晏慧
2018年3月30日
自从美联储开始提高联邦基金利率，市场便开始猜测美联储会于何时提高这一利率，提高的幅度有多大？每当针对这一问题的回答凝聚成共识，各国市场都将面临骤升或暴跌。
人们对利率的执迷简单明了却令人费解。事实上，一味关注利率具有误导性，是执迷不悟。那为什么会出现这种情况呢？这一问题可以部分归因于凯恩斯主义的后遗症，因为凯恩斯主义就非常关注利率。今天普遍采用的主流宏观经济模式都被称作“新凯恩斯”模式。在这一模式下，货币政策的作用完全表现为当前或预期利率（货币价格）的变化。然而，货币量却不见了踪影。
如此关注利率具有误导性，并为两类人带来了困扰：一类是当前经济环境的观察家和预言者，另一类是对过去重大经济市场事件的解读者。例如：诺贝尔经济学奖得主、新兴凯恩斯学派成员罗伯特·希勒（Robert Shiller）在他的著名著作——《非理性繁荣》（Irrational Exuberance）中曾作出如下论断：1929年股市崩盘是因为美联储实行了过度紧缩的货币政策。希勒下此结论，原因在于他关注利率，并且他认为美联储于1929年8月提高贴现率的举动是缩紧银根的信号。但根据埃尔穆斯·威克(Elmus Wicker)在《华尔街、美联储和股市投机行为回顾》（Wall Street, the Federal Reserve and Stock Market Speculation: A Retrospective）中的详细记录，在1929年股市崩盘之前，美联储采取的是宽松的货币政策，而非紧缩的货币政策。
人们对于汇率非常执着，自1923年凯恩斯在《货币改革论》（A Tract on Monetary Reform）中阐释货币及其决定国民收入的作用后更是如此。其后，凯恩斯又在其1930年出版的两卷本著作《货币论》（A Treatise on Money）中大篇幅讲述银行及其创造货币的重要作用。特别需要指出的是，凯恩斯将货币分为两类：国家货币和银行货币。国家货币由央行创造，而银行货币是通过商业银行的存款创造产生的。
凯恩斯在《货币论》中花费了大量篇幅讲述了银行货币。这不足为奇，因为凯恩斯在1930年曾明确提出，银行货币量远大于国家货币量。然而自此以后，情况也基本未发生改变。今天，银行货币占英国广义货币（M4）的77%。在美国，情况也相差无异，银行货币占广义国币（M4）的78%。
我们应当关注广义货币（包括国家货币和银行货币）以及得到合理衡量的货币（如情况允许，采用迪维希亚货币，而非进行简单的数值估量）。在中期内，决定国民收入的货币手段是关键。货币供应增长率同名义国民生产总值以及名义总需求增长的关系清晰且密切。尽管如此，仍有许多人否认基本的原理和数世纪积累的证据。
那么，现在的情况如何呢？正如下表所示，被衡量货币（迪维希亚广义货币M4）的增长率几乎完全等同于其4.8%的趋势增长率。还不错。
美国迪维希亚广义货币M4（名义）年增长率来源：金融稳定中心
统计：约翰霍普金斯大学史蒂夫·H·汉克（Steve H. Hanke）教授
如果我们来看美国经济名义总需求（以国内采购商的最终销售额为衡量标准，国内采购商最终销售额=国内生产总值+进口额-出口额-库存变化）增长率，该增长率仅略高于4.7%的趋势增长率。（见下表）也不错。
美国国内采购商最终销售额年增长率 来源：经济分析局、美国商务部
统计：约翰霍普金斯大学史蒂夫·H·汉克（Steve H. Hanke）
所以，一切进展顺利，同趋势增长率相符。那会出现什么问题呢？最大的风险在于，美联储这一脚急刹车可能会用力过猛，导致广义货币增长减速。这将造成总需求增长减速，原本较为平衡的局面也会受到影响。如果各位想继续关注这一方面，就不要沉迷于美联储基金率变化，而是着眼于广义货币——迪维希亚货币的最佳衡量指标。
英文原文如下：
Keep Your Eye on Broad Money; That’s What Counts
Steve H. Hanke
March 30, 2018.
Ever since the U.S. Federal Reserve began raising the federal funds rate, the market has been obsessed with speculation about when and how much the Fed will raise that rate. Each time a consensus congeals around the answer to that question, all the world’s markets either soar or dive.
This obsession with the interest rate story is simple, but strange. Indeed, it is misguided — wrongheaded. So, why the fixation? It is, in part, the result of a Keynesian hangover, due to the Keynesians’ focus on interest rates. The mainstream macroeconomic model that is widely in use today is referred to as the “New Keynesian” model. The thrust of monetary policy contained in this model is entirely captured by changes in current and expected interest rates (the price of money). Money — that is the quantity of money — is nowhere to be found, however.
This misguided focus on interest rates not only poses a problem for those who are observing the current economic environment and formulating expectations, but also for those who are interpreting important economic and market events of the past. For example, Nobelist and Keynesian Robert Shiller, in his famous book, Irrational Exuberance, comes to the conclusion that the stock market crash in 1929 was caused by the Fed’s excessively restrictive monetary policy. That’s because Shiller focuses on interest rates and thinks that the Fed’s increase in the discount rate in August 1929 signaled monetary tightening. But, as Elmus Wicker carefully documents in Wall Street, the Federal Reserve and Stock Market Speculation: A Retrospective, the Fed was accommodative, not restrictive, prior to the 1929 stock market crash.
The interest rate obsession is amazing, particularly since Keynes dedicates quite a few pages in A Tract on Monetary Reform (1923) to money and its role in national income determination. Then, in his two-volume 1930 work,A Treatise on Money, Keynes devotes a great deal of space to banks and their important role in creating money. In particular, Keynes separates money into two classes: state money and bank money. State money is produced by central banks, while bank money is produced by commercial banks through deposit creation.
Keynes spends many pages in the Treatise dealing with bank money. This isn’t surprising because, as Keynes makes clear, bank money was much larger than state money in 1930. Well, not much has changed since then. Today, bank money accounts for almost 77% of the broad money supply (M4) in the United Kingdom. In the United States, the picture is the same, with bank money accounting for 78% of broad money (M4).
We should keep our eyes on money broadly measured (state, plus bank money), and money properly measured (when available, Divisia, not simple sum measures). A monetary approach to national income determination is what counts over the medium term. The link between the growth rate of the money supply and both nominal GDP and nominal aggregate demand growth is unambiguous and overwhelming. Never mind. There remain plenty of deniers of basic principles and centuries of clear evidence.
So, just where do things stand today in the U.S.? The growth rate in money measured (Divisia M4) is almost exactly equal to its trend rate of 4.8%, as shown in the chart below. Not bad.
If we move to the rate of growth for the economy’s nominal aggregate demand (measured by Final Sales to Domestic Purchasers, which equals GDP + Imports - Exports - Change in Inventory), it is just a tad over the trend rate of growth of 4.7% (see the chart below). Again, not bad.
So, everything is running pretty smoothly — right on the trend rates. What could go wrong? The biggest risk is that the Fed could slam on the breaks too hard, and broad money growth would decelerate. That would cause aggregate demand to slow, and everything that is so nicely balanced would, well, not be so nicely balanced. If you want to follow this saga, stop obsessing over the Fed funds rate moves, and keep your eyes on the best measure for the growth of broad money, Divisia M4.
内容整理 叶祎然
图文编辑 叶祎然
审校 田雯
监制 朱霜霜
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